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Abstract 
This summary report presents the results of a comprehensive study described in the 
topical study ‘Events related to design deficiency’. The study has been conducted to 
review the recent worldwide operating experience and to draw from it the lessons learned 
and recommendations to improve the safety performance of nuclear power plants (NPPs). 
The work covers all kinds of commercial power reactors currently or recently in operation 
and all off-power modes of operation. The sources of operating experience for the study 
are the international reporting system for operating experience (IRS) database, the 
licensee event reports (LERs) of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (US 
NRC), the French operational experience database Sapide and the German operational 
experience database VERA. Thousands of event reports were screened to select those 
more relevant for the objectives of the study. This resulted in a list of 774 event reports. 
After different approaches applied in examining pre-defined categories and families of 
events, it was concluded that six common major issues could be defined to present the 
areas of concern in the best way. Accordingly, the 29 recommendations from this study 
are distributed under these topics: unanalysed conditions, instrumentation and control, 
robustness of design, ageing, internal and external hazards, and quality of 
documentation. 
These recommendations are expected to help the licensees and the regulatory authorities 
to recognise latent weaknesses dating from the design phases of the NPPs, before the 
start of NPP operation, and perform adequate measures to prevent the occurrence of 
events similar to those described in this report. The report can also be used as a good 
reference for new NPP construction projects. 
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1. Introduction 
The European network on operating experience feedback (OEF) for NPPs, or ‘European 
Clearinghouse’, was established by European nuclear safety regulators to promote the 
regional sharing of operating experience, the dissemination of lessons learned from NPP 
operation, and the understanding of the role of OEF systems in the safe and reliable 
operation of existing and new-build NPPs. The centralised office of the European 
Clearinghouse is operated by the Joint Research Centre (JRC) of the European 
Commission. 
One of the technical tasks of the European Clearinghouse consists in performing in-depth 
analysis of families of events (‘topical studies’) in order to identify the main recurring 
causes, contributing factors and lessons learned and to disseminate and promote 
recommendations aiming to reduce the reoccurrence of similar events in the future. 
Requested by European Clearinghouse members, this topical study provides an analysis 
of the event reports in which design deficiency played the main or contributing role in the 
development of an event. This report was prepared in cooperation with the Institut de 
Radioprotection et de Sûreté Nucléaire (IRSN), France, and Gesellschaft für Anlagen und 
Reaktorsicherheit mbH (GRS), Germany. These two institutions analysed information 
from their respective databases, i.e. France and Germany, while the JRC processed 
information from the IRS and US NRC licensee event reports. At the latest stage, JRC 
staff combined all results in the present study. 
This report summarises the main findings and recommendations from the topical study 
Events related to design deficiency [1]. The main objective of the topical study is to draw 
the generic and case-specific lessons learned from the events contained in the databases, 
and to provide recommendations to the members of the European Clearinghouse on 
operational experience for NPPs. More specifically, the study aims to reveal latent 
weaknesses dating from the design phases, i.e. before the start of NPP operation. These 
weaknesses could be discovered not only during the operation of the plant when they 
trigger actual events, but, in many cases, they could also be discovered through other 
related activities (e.g. regular plant assessments) or even unrelated activities (e.g. 
walkdowns). Moreover, the study should provide useful lessons to those who are in a 
position to initiate adequate changes in their area of work to improve the safety of 
nuclear power plants. 
Relevant references for assessing design deficiencies can be found in two International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) documents. The first, IAEA SSR-2/1, Safety of nuclear 
power plants: Design [2] gives requirements for the design of nuclear power plants. The 
other one, IAEA GS-G-3.5, The management system for nuclear installations [3], 
provides recommendations and guidance for developing the design process or processes. 
As in most studies of this type, the discovered deficiencies are, in fact, causes or 
potential causes of undesirable events. It should be emphasised that regardless of its 
importance for a particular event, each cause is worth treating adequately in accordance 
with its potential risk for nuclear safety. Sometimes it is not easy to estimate the risk and 
that is why we should treat them equally, regardless of whether they produced or just 
contributed to the event. 
In 2011, the European Clearinghouse issued the topical report Analysis of nuclear power 
plants modifications events [4]. It covered NPP events related to modifications to 
structures, systems and components, to process software, to operational limits and 
conditions, to operating procedures and to management systems. The present study 
does not overlap excessively with this report. The main difference between these two 
studies should be in events of concern. Design deficiencies in the ‘modifications’ study 
mostly come from a deficiency in the modification process, and deficiencies in the ‘design 
deficiency’ study come from NPP design phases which often resulted in design-change 
requirements. 
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2. Methodology 
2.1. Description of the databases 
This study used data from four NPP reported events databases. 
The IRS is an international system jointly operated by the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) and the Nuclear Energy Agency of the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD/NEA). The fundamental objective of the IRS is to 
contribute to improving the safety of commercial NPPs which are operated worldwide. 
The IRS database contains more than 4000 event reports with detailed descriptions and 
analyses of the events’ causes that may be relevant to other plants. 
United States commercial nuclear reactor licensees are required to report certain events 
according to US NRC Regulation 10CFR50.73. These LERs are available to the public on 
the NRC’s website, which contains LERs from 1980 onwards. More than 50 000 events 
are currently available. This database is searchable using a variety of criteria, including 
name, date, reactor type and vendor or text search in the title, abstract or full report. 
The IRSN database, called Sapide, is managed by the IRSN department in charge of 
analysing the OEF. The database contains events in French NPPs reported since 1973, 
but it has been improved over the years. A significant improvement was implemented in 
1996 and the information contained in the database has been more detailed since that 
upgrade. 
The German database VERA is a GRS database which contains reportable events 
occurring at German NPPs. This database, used for the systematic evaluation of 
operating experience, includes over 6 300 events, which have been reported in detail 
since 1975. In this study, all reported events that occurred at German NPPs between 
1992 and 2011 were examined. 
2.2. Screening of events 
In order to retrieve the relevant events, it was necessary to carry out a screening of the 
information sources used for the study. Each database used is structured in a different 
way and features different searching capabilities. For these reasons, the screening 
criteria were database-specific. Since not all events are fully applicable for the study, all 
selected reports were examined and only those with the most valuable lessons were 
selected for in-depth analysis. 
IRS events from 1990 or later were retrieved and a total of 581 events were obtained. All 
these were then checked to determine whether they met the scope of the study. After 
screening, a total of 297 event reports were retained for detailed analysis. 
In the US NRC LER database, identification of events relevant for the study resulted in 
341 events for the whole database time period. After further analysis, it was decided to 
use events from 1990, and 156 events were found interesting for study. 
Similarly, from the French database Sapide, 103 events were selected for study, and 
from the German database VERA, the number of events selected for further study was 
218. 
In total, 774 events were chosen for in-depth analysis. 
2.3. Classification of events 
All event reports selected for full analysis were classified into categories and families 
according to a number of criteria. To complete the categorisation of the events, specific 
sets of families were defined and specific assumptions used. That way, the events with 
similar characteristics were grouped. 
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This grouping of the events was done with a double aim: understanding the 
phenomenology of the events observed and helping in the extraction of valuable lessons 
and recommendations. Furthermore, after careful analysis of events reported in all four 
databases, it was found that lessons are more efficiently presented when events are 
grouped as discussed in the lessons learned section of the main report. 
‘General plant design characteristic/principle affected’ is the one of the main categories 
defined based on IAEA SSR-2/1, Safety of nuclear power plants: Design [2]. This 
document gives general plant requirements for design basis, design for safe operation 
over the lifetime of the plant, human factors, other design considerations and safety 
analysis. 
The ‘design phase concerned’ category originates from IAEA GS-G-3.5, The management 
system for nuclear installations [3] which gives recommendations and guidance for 
requirements set mainly in reference [2]. Examples of families in this category are 
‘design initiation’, ‘specification of scope and planning’, ‘work control and planning of 
design activities’, ‘configuration management’, etc. 
Other important categories include: ‘specific plant systems affected’; ‘affected 
components’; ‘detection mode’; ‘impact on safety’ and ‘corrective measures’. 
2.4. Analysis 
The categorisation of events reveals a phenomenological description of the event types’ 
distribution. It is a simple way to identify dominant events. Events grouped around a 
common topic frequently reveal a general issue. These events, depending on impact on 
safety, can provide the most valuable lesson to stakeholders. 
Thus, for example, grouping events under the most dominant families of the ‘general 
plant design characteristic/principle affected’ category can point to the design 
requirements that are too often breached or challenged. 
Dominant families in the ‘design phase concerned’ category may extract critical phases in 
the designing process that should be better managed. 
The ‘specific plant systems affected’ category groups events around systems that may 
need more attention. Accordingly, the ‘affected components’ category’s dominant families 
point to critical components. 
The most common modes of detection from the ‘detection mode’ category show how the 
failure is discovered and their trend could have an important influence on some NPPs’ 
strategies for discovering deficiencies. 
The ‘impact on safety’ category simply shows whether the events resulted in degraded 
safety features, which is helpful in understanding the risk of a specific event, and could 
also give a general perception of risk in the concrete area of concern — in this case, 
design deficiency. 
To reveal the areas where most of the corrective actions are aimed, the ‘corrective 
measures’ category is used. The measures could also influence the NPP’s strategy for 
areas (families) which are more affected. 
Finally, one additional technique was employed to extract the most important topics of 
concern in the area of NPPs’ design deficiencies. For this technique, the problem 
statement of each event was defined. All the problem statements were examined and 
distributed to the appropriate groups, which became a set of common major issues which 
were analysed separately. General recommendations based on events under that topic 
were defined. 
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3. Results of analysis and recommendations 
Due to the high dispersion of results between four databases and seven main categories, 
as well as some obvious deficiencies which could not be satisfactorily categorised in the 
pre-defined categories, it was concluded that six common major issues categories 
properly summarise most of the concerns related to design. Accordingly, the 29 
recommendations from this study are distributed under these six issues categories: 
 Unanalysed condition; 
 Instrumentation and control (I&C); 
 Robustness of design; 
 Ageing; 
 Internal and external hazards; and 
 Quality of documentation. 
The distribution of these issues is presented as a graph in Figure 1: Common major 
issues. 
 
Figure 1: Common major issues 1 
It can be noted that almost half of United States LERs are grouped under the ‘unanalysed 
condition’ issue. The reason for this could lie in different reporting criteria, which may be 
more rigorous regarding unanalysed or not-predicted conditions, but also because of a 
stronger review process in the United States (more than half are detected by review 
process). The other three databases show a fairly similar distribution 
3.1. Unanalysed conditions 
The group of events under the ‘unanalysed conditions’ category presents a very dominant 
common major issue. Not recognising potential safety problems was directly related to 
this topic, since many different kinds of analyses and controls missed the opportunity to 
detect them. Most events in this category have in common that the design failed to 
appropriately identify either the initiators or contributors of design-basis accidents, or the 
failure modes of safety systems during accident conditions. 
                                          
1 The values are presented as a percentage of the total number of selected events in each database. 
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The following recommendations have been derived from the events reviewed in the 
study, and highlight some of the safety analysis issues experienced by nuclear power 
plants in the past 20-30 years. 
 Operational limits and conditions should be well defined, and operating procedures 
should take unambiguous steps to prevent the operation of the reactor beyond the 
specified limits. 
 The design of safety-related gate valves should properly address the risk of 
pressure locking and thermal binding during all scenarios, including test conditions. 
 During the cold shutdown mode of operation, it is essential that the hydrogen 
concentration in the coolant and in the void spaces in the primary circuit be 
monitored systematically and that potential areas of hydrogen accumulation be 
ventilated permanently. 
 Ventilation systems’ design should adequately account for all emergency situations. 
An unanticipated interaction may occur when an exhaust system is not well 
balanced with a supply system, or would not trip if the diesel generator sequencer 
were actuated. All possible design-basis accident scenarios should be evaluated in 
order to verify if ventilation systems would work as designed. 
 The thermal study of premises containing equipment important to safety should be 
comprehensive, in order to prove that ambient temperature increase will not render 
safety equipment inoperable when ventilation is not available. 
 The design of the component cooling water system should take into account 
temperature transients experienced during accident conditions by portions of the 
system located inside the containment. All possible scenarios in accordance with 
emergency procedures should be analysed. Special attention should be paid to 
component cooling water system pump restart after isolation during some design-
basis accidents. 
 The design of oil-cooled large power transformers should include protective 
measures to contain oil spills. All possible leak paths should be analysed. 
 Safe shutdown analyses should be reviewed to verify the capability to isolate the 
reactor coolant pump seal leak offline, in case of loss of cooling to the seals after 
fire or Station black-out events. 
3.2. Instrumentation and control 
The group under this category presents the events where instrumentation and control 
deficiencies were detected and the roots of problems are closely connected with design 
phases. 
According to IAEA requirements [2] regarding design-basis accidents (requirement 19): 
‘design basis accidents shall be used to define the design bases, including performance 
criteria, for safety systems and for other items important to safety that are necessary to 
control design basis accident conditions, with the objective of returning the plant to a 
safe state and mitigating the consequences of any accident’. Unfortunately, some events 
showed that some I&C components important in case of design-basis accidents are 
vulnerable under those conditions. 
The following recommendations can help in the prevention of these I&C vulnerabilities. 
 Regular simulator usage (e.g. training, plant changes) should be used to identify 
potential I&C deficiencies in safety-related systems. In particular, different 
combinations of events paired with maintenance and single failures should be taken 
into account. 
 Operating experience should be collected during the construction of new plants, in 
particular regarding design deficiencies in I&C systems. 
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 It should be ensured that I&C equipment specifications include all necessary 
electrical parameters, so that these parameters may be confirmed during the 
equipment qualification. 
 Special attention should be paid to protection circuit applications. Tests should be 
carried out during commissioning to ensure that short-circuit protections do not 
falsely respond on the activation of safety-significant motors. 
 The I&C of operational functions should be independent of safety functions I&C. 
 Instrumentation piping should be carefully designed and tested to prevent pressure 
build-up or any other phenomena that could affect instrument response, erroneous 
readings and subsequent spurious actuation of protections of safety systems. 
 The results of Probabilistic safety assessment studies should be considered as a 
valuable source to detect inadvertent dependencies among systems propagated 
through poorly designed I&C systems, for instance instrument air and essential 
power systems. 
 The design of I&C used to measure water levels during mid-loop and draindown 
operations should be carefully reviewed to detect any common cause of failure 
mode in its design. 
3.3. Robustness of design 
Some of the reported events contain examples of equipment or components with a 
design lacking the necessary robustness, rendering safety systems vulnerable to minor 
deviations from normal operating conditions. Presented events could have been 
prevented if the design process had been performed in accordance with standards and 
proven practice. Requirement 18, ‘Engineering design rules’, of IAEA SSR-2/1 [2] simply 
states: 'Methods to ensure a robust design shall be applied, and proven engineering 
practices shall be adhered to in the design of a nuclear power plant to ensure that the 
fundamental safety functions are achieved for all operational states and for all accident 
conditions'2. 
None of the issues in this category (debris in containment during a LOCA, pipes and 
conduits fretting, power switches too sensitive to vibrations and valves stuck by 
dirt/corrosion) have been sufficiently considered by the relevant engineering discipline. 
 Licensees and/or regulators should perform studies on possible reactor containment 
building sump filters clogging during the recirculation phase following a Loss of 
coolant accident. Subject to the results of these studies, modifications or 
replacement of the recirculation filters could be considered. 
 Design of piping and tubing at particular locations like the feeder cabinet in heavy 
water reactors should take into account the risk of damage to piping/tubing/cables 
caused by fretting. 
 Safety equipment power switch design should be sufficiently robust, so as not to be 
spuriously triggered by mechanical loads (e.g. vibrations). 
 A preventive and surveillance maintenance programme should be set up to detect 
valves stuck by corrosion or dirt in those applications where the valves are not 
frequently operated. A complete list of such valves should be established and 
checks should be carried out on those installed in the systems important to safety. 
3.4. Ageing 
The group under this category presents the events related to inappropriate ageing 
management defined in design phases. Requirement 31 of IAEA SSR-2/1 [2] states: ‘The 
design for a nuclear power plant shall take due account of ageing and wear out effects in 
                                          
2  ‘Safety of nuclear power plants: Design’, IAEA SSR-2/1, January 2012, IAEA, Vienna, 2012, p. 22. 
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all operational states for which a component is credited, including testing, maintenance, 
maintenance outages, plant states during a postulated initiating event and plant states 
following a postulated initiating event’3. 
Corrosion in primary circuits, engineering safety features pump vibrations, subsidence of 
piping, different types of corrosion, pollution effects and many other issues addressed 
under these topics caused, contributed or could cause the serious failures of safety 
systems. 
 The design of piping in auxiliary systems physically connected to the reactor coolant 
system should account for a number of thermal-hydraulic phenomena observed in 
existing reactors that may lead to piping corrosion or fatigue damage, with the 
potential for a loss-of-coolant accident. 
 Enhanced monitoring methods should be used to detect the development of 
deposits at the steam generators’ upper support plates. 
 The design of safety equipment subject to environmental conditions should 
accurately take into account all requirements resulting from loading cases, and the 
qualification tests should be sufficiently representative of real conditions during an 
accident. 
3.5. Internal and external hazards 
Requirement 17 of IAEA SSR-2/1 [2] states that ‘all foreseeable internal hazards and 
external hazards, including the potential for human induced events directly or indirectly 
to affect the safety of the nuclear power plant, shall be identified and their effects shall 
be evaluated. Hazards shall be considered for determination of the postulated initiating 
events and generated loadings for use in the design of relevant items important to safety 
for the plant4…’ 
 The safety case for seismic risk should be carefully reviewed to assess the 
consequences of fire and floods induced by earthquakes. 
 The cooling water intake structure should be reviewed, where applicable, to detect 
potential vulnerabilities related to frazil ice accumulation. 
 Where applicable, the design of the plant should consider extreme cold weather as 
an external event with the potential to cause common cause failures modes related 
to safety. The impact of a loss of offsite power (caused by the cold weather) on 
electrical heating systems used to protect equipment from freezing conditions 
should be addressed. 
 The effects of an outdoor fire on the ventilation system of safety-relevant buildings 
should be thoroughly assessed. The possible ingress of smoke into the respective 
buildings and the resulting potentially safety-related consequences should be 
considered in particular. 
3.6. Quality of documentation 
A very important phase in the design process is the detailed design and production of 
design documentation. IAEA GS-G-3.5, The management system for nuclear installations 
[3] states that ‘calculations, analyses and studies should be documented in sufficient 
detail and should be controlled in such a manner that subsequent users of the design, in 
the various stages of the lifetime of the installation, can understand the design and make 
informed decisions. Inputs, assumptions, modelling, test and development work and 
                                          
3  ‘Safety of nuclear power plants: Design’, IAEA No SSR-2/1, January 2012, IAEA, Vienna, 2012, p. 29. 
4  ‘Safety of nuclear power plants: Design’, IAEA No SSR-2/1, January 2012, IAEA, Vienna, 2012, p. 20. 
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results, safe operating parameters and envelopes, key acceptance criteria and 
parameters for commissioning tests, for example, should all be documented. 
Design activities should ensure that specified requirements are correctly translated into 
design outputs, such as: Basic design of the installation; Design computer codes; Design 
specifications; and Functional specifications5.’ 
Since modern computer technologies offer many new solutions and possibilities to 
interlink all NPP drawings, records and all other dependent documents, and provide 
smart interconnections and fast access through user-friendly interfaces (e.g. plant 
information models), it is expected that this topic will have less issues compared to the 
past. 
 Design documentation should translate the requirement to maintain safety systems 
such as emergency core cooling, decay heat removal, and containment spray 
systems full of water into drawings, specifications, procedures, and instructions. 
The design should identify potential gas source accumulation locations and 
symptoms of gas leakage from potential sources. 
 The identification of equipment in drawings should accurately match the actual 
labelling displayed on the equipment. 
3.7. Additional findings 
Because of the dominance of the ‘actual consequences’ family of events and since the 
IRS collects events from NPPs from all over the world, this was considered important for 
further examination. A trend graph was created (Figure 2: Trend graph of detection 
modes of design deficiency in IRS). The graph shows that the number of events with 
actual consequences is increasing and gives a signal that some other detection 
approaches should be further employed or improved. The sudden drop in the number of 
events that are detected by surveillance and reviews may indicate obsolete or inadequate 
deficiency detection methods. 
 
 
Figure 2: Trend graph of detection modes of design deficiency in IRS6 
                                          
5  ‘The management system for nuclear installations’, IAEA No GS-G-3.5, September 2009, IAEA, Vienna, 
2009, p. 64. 
6  Values in the graph present the relative portion of each parameter during each observed period. 
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The other databases show a much higher proportion of deficiencies identified through 
reviews, maintenance, etc. Thus, the United States, France and Germany are considered 
to have a more adequate approach to detecting reported deficiencies. 
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4. Conclusions 
This topical study was conducted to review the worldwide operating experience from 
events where design deficiencies have been addressed and to extract valuable lessons 
and recommendations to improve the safety performance of nuclear plants. The work 
covered all kinds of commercial power reactors in operation. 
The sources of operating experience for the study were the IRS database, LERs from the 
US NRC, the French operational experience database Sapide and the German operational 
experience database VERA. Thousands of event reports were screened to select those 
most relevant to the objectives of the study. This resulted in a list of 774 event reports, 
listed in the annexes, which was judged to be sufficient to derive sound and 
representative lessons learned and recommendations. 
A detailed examination of selected events was conducted, classifying them according to 
different defined criteria, in order to gain good insight into the nature of the design 
deficiency problems. The main part of the review was, however, the qualitative 
assessment of the events, with emphasis on lessons learned and recommendations that 
have been derived from them. 
The analysis of how design deficiencies are detected by licensees identified that, for the 
IRS database, design issues are most often revealed only by an event with actual 
consequences, rather than, as would be desirable, by engineering reviews, inspections or 
surveillance activities. Furthermore, the trend for this type of detection mode is to 
increase over time. Therefore, design reviews and other methods to detect design 
deficiencies might need to be encouraged in some countries. Unlike the IRS database, 
the other databases show a much higher proportion of deficiencies identified through 
reviews, maintenance, etc. 
It was concluded that six common major issues categories could be defined to properly 
summarise most of the concerns related to design. Accordingly, the 29 recommendations 
from this study are distributed under these six topics: 
• Unanalysed conditions; 
• Instrumentation and control; 
• Robustness of design; 
• Ageing; 
• Internal and external hazards; and 
• Quality of documentation. 
Considering that many of the events reviewed in the topical study occurred a long time 
ago, licensees were probably already informed about them through different OEF 
communication channels and implemented appropriate actions to prevent reoccurrence 
on their sites. Therefore, in the first place, recommendations from described reports 
should be used to check if those applicable have been adequately implemented in 
affected NPPs. If not, further assessment should be performed and adequate priority for 
necessary changes should be given to each of them. 
Recommendations from the topical study presented in this summary report are more 
general and they are expected to help licensees and regulatory authorities to perform 
adequate measures to prevent the occurrence of events similar to those described in this 
report. It would also be highly desirable to discuss all recommendations with senior 
managers of NPPs. 
Nevertheless, it should be emphasised that design process management flaws are 
evident in all the events on which the main recommendations are based. Therefore, a 
successful management should establish high level of safety and strong culture of safety. 
To establish effective safety strategy necessary for preventing accidents and mitigating 
14 
  
the consequences, management should integrate good design and engineering features 
by providing adequate safety margins, diversity and redundancy [5]. 
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- by email via: http://europa.eu/contact 
FINDING INFORMATION ABOUT THE EU 
Online 
Information about the European Union in all the official languages of the EU is available on the Europa 
website at: http://europa.eu 
EU publications 
You can download or order free and priced EU publications from EU Bookshop at: 
http://publications.europa.eu/eubookshop. Multiple copies of free publications may be obtained by contacting 
Europe Direct or your local information centre (see http://europa.eu/contact). 
K
J-N
A
-2
8
7
1
9
-E
N
-N
 
doi 10.2760/006508 
ISBN 978-92-79-71480-1 
